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We argue that spatial inequality of industry location is a primary cause of spatial income 
inequality in developing nations. We focus on understanding the process of spatial 
industrial variation—identifying the spatial factors that have cost implications for firms, 
and the factors that influence the location decisions of new industrial units. The analysis 
has two parts. First we examine the contribution of economic geography factors to the 
cost structure of firms in eight industry sectors and show that local industrial diversity is 
the one factor with significant and substantial cost reducing effects. We then show that 
new private sector industrial investments in India are biased toward existing industrial 
and coastal districts, whereas state industrial investments (in deep decline after 
structural reforms) are far less biased toward such districts. We conclude that structural 
reforms lead to increased spatial inequality in industrialization, and therefore, income. 
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1 Introduction 
Spatial inequality refers to a condition in which different spatial or geographical units are 
at different levels on some variable of interest, usually (average) income. Why should 
different geographical units within a nation be at different income levels? This question is 
not answered simply. There are several overlapping reasons for the existence of 
intranational spatial inequality; history, natural resources, human capital, local political 
economy, and culture have all been identified as contributory factors. Here, we seek to 
understand spatial inequality in terms of industrialization and industrial location. We argue 
that modern economic growth is driven by productivity increases which, in turn, are driven 
by industrialization in the developing world. Therefore spatial units that have industrialized 
are more productive and have higher incomes than spatial units that have not industrialized 
or have industrialized less (we are not considering post-industrial, service sector-led 
growth, a condition that is characteristic of developed nations but quite marginal in 
developing nations). In other words, geographical variation in industrialization is a primary 
cause of geographical variation in average income in developing nations. 
 
This is the first part of our argument, which we view as self evident and therefore will not 
seek to prove. Our interest is in understanding the process of spatial industrial variation, 
that is, in identifying the factors that determine industrial location decisions, and to show 
how recent policy changes have led to increasing spatial industrial inequality, and 
therefore, spatial income inequality. We argue, following the tradition of the cumulative 
causation theorists, that industrialization follows the classic ‘virtuous cycle’ principles. 
New industries locate where other industries already exist. This is done to avail of 
productivity advantages in existing industrial regions. However, not all industries seek 
such profit maximizing locations. State-owned industry location decisions include 
consideration of regional balance, national security, and political gains. However, the role 
of the state as industrial owner and industrial location regulator has been substantially 
curtailed under the regime of liberalization and structural reforms. Therefore, with the 
increasing dominance of private sector industrialization, we expect that industries will be 
more spatially concentrated in leading industrial regions, which will lead to higher levels 
of spatial inequality. 
 
We test this theoretical framework with Indian data from the 1990s. First we test the 
hypothesis that economic geography factors influence productivity by examining the cost 
structure of eight manufacturing industry sectors.1 In a significant departure from existing 
models of industry clustering, we show that only a single economic geography factor has 
cost-reducing effects—this is industrial diversity (which is high in metropolitan and other 
mixed industrial regions). Next, we show that location decisions of state-owned industry 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper the term industry specifically refers to manufacturing industry, and does not include 
financial or business services.    2
and private sector industry are, indeed, influenced by different factors, where private 
industrial units favor locations in existing industrial areas. We also show that the private 
sector is the primary source of new industrial investments. We conclude that liberalization 
and structural reforms have led to higher levels of spatial inequality in industrialization in 
India. 
 
The material in this paper brings together two interconnected research programs. We draw 
on two somewhat distinct literatures, use two clearly distinct methodologies, and analyze 
similar but distinct datasets. Therefore, we present the arguments, the literature, the 
methodology, and the findings in two separate sections. Section 1 is on cost effects of 
manufacturing industry location, and Section 2 looks at location patterns of private and 
state capital, followed by a single concluding section in which we reconcile the findings of 
the two sections. 
 
But, before we proceed further it is necessary to explain the meaning of spatial inequality 
as used in this paper. What is the appropriate scale for measuring income differences? 
Spatial inequalities exist at all scales—from the neighborhood, the municipality, and the 
district or county, through the province or state, and the nation. Which of these inequalities 
are most meaningful? For the purpose of this paper, we suggest that inequalities between 
spatial units that are also discrete policy units and for which income data are available are 
meaningful units. That is, there may indeed exist significant inequalities between 
neighborhoods, but if neighborhoods cannot create policies that affect income, or if income 
cannot be measured at the neighborhood level, they are not considered relevant spatial 
units. To the extent that municipalities can create policies that influence income generation 
and such income can be measured, they should be considered relevant units; however, rural 
areas will have to be left out of such calculations. Inequality between nations is large 
subject with its own literature. We are left with district and provincial inequality. The 
latter, also termed regional inequality, has typically been the unit of interest in inequality 
studies, largely because it is the smallest spatial unit for which income data are available.2 
Our ultimate interest is also in the provincial scale, which, in India, is represented by 
linguistically defined states. However, since location analysis is best carried out at scales 
smaller than Indian states (some of which are large enough to be large countries), the 
analysis here is undertaken at the district scale.3 
2  Cost effects of industry location 
Our empirical strategy in this section is to estimate a cost function to see how cost (thereby 
profits) are affected by the economic geography of the region where the firm is located. If 
                                                 
2 There is a large literature on intranational regional inequality starting with the general approaches of 
Myrdal (1957), Hirschman (1958), Borts (1960), Williamson (1965), and Friedman (1973:41-64). More 
recently, Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) work on regional convergence has received attention, especially in 
developed nations. State-level regional inequality studies of India have been done by Chakravorty (2000) and 
Ghosh et al. (1998). 
3 The district is the second tier of subnational administration in India, similar to counties in the United States 
and municipios in Brazil.   3
specific factors related to the local economic geography have cost reducing impacts, then 
firms are likely to choose regions with disproportionately higher levels of these factors. 
The analytic framework to examine location of manufacturing industry primarily draws on 
recent findings from the ‘new economic geography’ (NEG) literature. Here, Krugman 
(1991) and Fujita et al. (1999) analytically model increasing returns, which stem from 
technological and pecuniary externalities. In models of technological externalities, 
interfirm information spillovers provide the incentives for agglomeration. Assuming that 
each firm produces different information, the benefits of interaction increases with the 
number of firms. This provides incentives for the entrepreneur to locate the firm in close 
proximity to other firms, leading to agglomeration. 
 
In addition, there are pecuniary benefits from sharing specialized input factors, utilizing 
scale economies in the production of shared inputs, collaboration to share information, and 
from the presence of interrelated industries. Transport costs are also important. According 
to Krugman (1991) agglomeration occurs at intermediate transport costs when the spatial 
mobility of labor is low (Fujita and Thisse 1996). Transport costs can be reduced by 
locating in areas with good access to input and output markets which also have high 
quality infrastructure linking firms to urban market centers. In summary, insights from 
NEG and regional science models suggest that own and interrelated industry 
concentrations, availability of reliable infrastructure to reduce transport costs and enhance 
market access, regional amenities and economic diversity are important for reducing costs, 
thereby influencing location and agglomeration of industry.  
 
To provide visual evidence on the degree to which industry locations are clustered over the 
national space, we include district level maps of location quotients (LQ) for four industry 
sectors in Figure 1. The LQ is simple measure of regional concentration used in regional 
science. It calculates the ratio of the share of a given variable to the share of population. 
Here, LQ = 1 indicates that the region’s share of a particular sector is equal to its share of 
all industry. If LQ = 3 it indicates that the region’s share of that sector is three times its 
share of all industry. Our goal is to analyze the cost implications of these location 
decisions. 
 
Before moving on to describing the economic geography variables and specifying the 
econometric specification, it is useful to think why these sources of externalities may 
matter in the estimation of costs over and beyond the benefits that are capitalized in the 
price of input factors. After all, if a region has relatively better endowments, the benefits 
should be reflected in lower prices of intermediate inputs, and may also bid up the prices of 
labor and capital as the more people and firms migrate to that region. If the extent of 
agglomeration economies are purely market based, it is possible that net benefits are 
capitalized. However, non pecuniary externalities of information and knowledge sharing 
do not lend themselves to direct capitalization. Further, market failures including 
coordination failure reduce the extent to which the economic geography variables are   
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capitalized in input prices. Finally, the extent to which these costs and benefits are 
capitalized into input prices is an empirical question, and one that we will examine in the 
following sections. 
2.1 Economic geography variables 
We now identify and define the specific economic geography variables that are expected to 
influence industry location by generating competitive cost effects. 
Market access  
In principle, improved access to consumer markets (including interindustry buyers and 
suppliers) will increase the demand for a firm's products, thereby providing the incentive to 
increase scale and invest in cost reducing technologies. Access to markets is determined by 
the distance from and the size and density of market centers in the vicinity of the firm. 
There is no prior reason why the extent of the market should be limited on a firm’s spatial 
vicinity (i.e. its own district), as long as there are adequate transport networks to connect 
its products to a greater market area, which could be the province, the nation or rest of the 
world. To model this type of potential interaction through a transport network, we draw on 
the classic gravity model, which is commonly used in the analysis of trade between regions 
and countries (Evenett and Keller 2002). Following Hansen (1959), we calculate access 
from the following definition: 













neis the potential accessibility indicator for location i based on the negative 
exponential distance decay function, Sj is a size indicator at destination j (for example, 
population, purchasing power or employment), dij is a measure of distance (or more 
generally,  friction) between origin i and destination j, and b describes how increasing 
distance reduces the expected level of interaction, and the parameter a is the distance to the 
point of inflection of the negative exponential function. We use the market access (MA) 
indicator developed by Lall et al. (2004a), who use population as the measure of size in Sj 
and network distance as the basis of the inverse weighting parameter. Their accessibility 
index describes market access using information on the Indian road network system and 
the location and population of urban centers.4  
 
In addition to market access, we develop indicators of local spatial externalities, which 
include own and Interindustry linkages. The main distinction in modeling these 
externalities and the treatment of market access is that we limit the spatial extent of the 
potential externality to the firm’s own district. We follow this approach as much of the 
literature on technological and pecuniary externalities suggests that localization economies 
are limited to firms that are located in close proximity (close being defined as census tracts 
in USA literature). Thus, given the already large size of Indian districts, we do not consider 
the impact of firms located in neighboring districts. Our aggregation scheme does 
introduce a problem as we tend to underestimate parameters for localization economies as 
the ‘true’ interaction often occurs as spatial scales below the district (for example, 
neighborhoods).5 We develop the following indicators of local spatial externalities. 
Own industry concentration 
The co-location of firms in the same industry (localization economies) generate 
externalities that enhance productivity of all firms in that industry (Henderson 1988; 
Henderson 2000; Ciccone and Hall 1996). Of the several ways of measuring localization 
economies we use own industry employment in the district to measure localization 
economies. Own industry employment is calculated from employment statistics provided 
in the 1998-99 sampling frame of the ASI, which provides employment data on the 
universe of industrial establishments in India.  
 
                                                 
4 The urban centers database used in Lall et al. (2004a) includes latitude and longitude coordinates and 1991 
population for 3,752 cities with a total population of about 217 million. The digital transport network dataset 
includes an estimated 400,000km of roads categorized into four classes by quality. The weighting parameter 
used in the accessibility computation is an estimate of travel time. As the exact geographic location of each 
firm is not publicly available, the authors summarize the accessibility for each district by averaging the 
individual values for all points that fall into the district. 
5 This however is the best available option as we cannot identify firms under the level of the distict.   6
Interindustry linkages 
In addition to intraindustry externality effects, we also include a measure to evaluate the 
importance of interindustry linkages in explaining firm level profitability, and thereby 
location decisions. In particular, we are interesting in finding out if proximity to suppliers 
reduces the cost of inputs, in addition to providing non pecuniary benefits of 
information/technology sharing.6 There are several approaches that can be used to define 
and measure supplier access—input-output linkage-based, labor skill-based, and 
technology flow-based. The most common approach is to use the national level input-
output account as a template for identifying strengths and weaknesses in regional buyer–
supplier linkages (Feser and Bergman 2000). Commonly, backward linkages are measured 
as technical coefficients from a national industry by industry transactions table. Technical 
coefficients are defined as column industry purchases from the row industry divided by the 
sum of all column industry sales and relate the dollar value of intermediate purchases from 
the upstream sector required to produce a dollar of the column industry’s output. Thus, the 
technical coefficient measures the degree of the column industry’s dependence on other 
industries for inputs to production. Following the methodology adopted in Lall et al. 
(2004b), we measure the firm’s dependence on backward linkages as the sum of its 
industry’s backward linkages with all other relevant sectors. For each column industry, 
backward linkages with each row industry are defined as the technical coefficient weighted 
by the region’s location quotient for the row industry. A matrix of regionally weighted 
backward linkages is defined as: 
 
()() () j   x   i i   x   r j   x   r Ω L = Λ  
 
where L is a region by industry matrix of location quotients for selling sectors and Ω 7 is a 
national direct requirements matrix of technical coefficients with purchasing industries as 
columns and supplying sectors as rows. Each column vector of Λ  is a composite measure 
of the j
th industry’s backward linkages for regions r. Therefore, a firm in region r and 
industry j has a measure of backward linkages  rj Λ . 
Economic diversity 
In addition to buyer–supplier linkages, there are other sources of interindustry externalities. 
Prominent among these is the classic Chinitz-Jacobs’ diversity. The diversity measure 
provides a summary measure of urbanization economies, which accrue across industry 
sectors and provide benefits to all firms in the agglomeration. Chinitz (1961) and Jacobs 
                                                 
6 In this analysis, we limit the analysis to buyer/supplier access, and do not include explicit measures of 
forward linkages (i.e., final demand). This is because the market access measure captures much of the 
forward linkages (sales to other firms and final consumers). 
7 For Ω , we use a 1996 matrix of national technical coefficients from the Input Output Transactions Table 
1993-94, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. Each element of L is a standard location 
quotient calculated as the sum of employment in region r and industry i.   7
(1969) proposed that important knowledge transfers primarily occur across industries and 
the diversity of local industry mix is important for these externality benefits. Here, we use 
the well known Herfindahl measure to examine the degree of economic diversity in each 
district. The Herfindahl index of a region r (Hr) is the sum of squares of employment 










2.2 Econometric specification 
In this subsection, we present the econometric specification to test the effects of economic 
geography factors in explaining the location of economic activity. Our basic premise is that 
firms will locate in a particular location if profits exceed some critical level demanded by 
entrepreneurs. We estimate a cost function with a mix of micro-level factory data and 
economic geography variables which may influence the cost structure of a production unit. 
A traditional cost function for a firm i is (subscript i is dropped for simplicity): 
 
C   =   f ( Y ,   w )             (1) 
 
where C is the total cost of production for firm i, Y is its total output, w is an n-dimensional 
vector of input prices. However, the economic geography—or the characteristics of the 
region where the firm is located—is also an important factor affecting the firm’s cost 
structure. We modify the basic cost function to include the influence of location-based 
externalities:  
 
Cr = f(Y, wr, Ar)            (2) 
 
where Cr is the total cost of a firm i in region r, wr is an input price vector for the firm in 
district  r, and A is a m-dimensional vector of location externalities (i.e., economic 
geography variables such as access to markets, buyer supplier networks, own industry 
concentration) at location r. 
 
The model has four conventional inputs: capital, labor, energy, and materials. Therefore, 
the total cost is the sum of the costs for all four inputs. With respect to agglomeration 
economies, it is assumed that there are four sources of agglomeration economies at the 
district level such that A={A1, A2, A3, A4}, where A1 is the market access measure, A2 is 
the concentration of own industry employment, A3 is the strength of buyer–supplier 
linkages, and A4 is the relative diversity in the region.  
                                                 
8. For more intuitive interpretation of the measure, for the diversity index in our model, Hr is subtracted from 
unity. Therefore, DVr=1-Hr. A higher value of DVr signifies that the regional economy is relatively more 
diversified.   8
Shephard’s Lemma produces the optimal cost-minimizing factor demand function for input 
j corresponding to input prices as follows: 
 











= ,  j = 1,2,3,4,....,n   (3) 
 
where Xj,r is the factor demand for j
th input of a firm in district r. It is clear that the firm’s 
factor demand is determined by its output, factor prices, and location externalities. 
Therefore, production equilibrium is defined by a series of equations derived from 
equation (2) and (3). The empirical implementation of above model is based on a translog 
functional form, which is a second-order approximation of any general cost function. Since 
there are four conventional inputs and four location externalities (agglomeration) variables, 
a translog cost function can be written as: 
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(j≠ k;l≠ q; j,k=1,2,3,4 ;l,q=1,2,3,4)   (4) 
The final model estimated includes two additional dummy variables that identify locational 
characteristics that may not be captured by agglomeration variables. Locations are 
categorized as rural, non-metro urban (D1), and metro urban (D2), and rural location is used 
as a reference category. In addition, we use a dummy variable to test if there are 
differences between public and private sector firms, and age to examine if profitability 
varies by firm age.  
 
The impact of the economic geography factors on the cost structure (or profitability) of the 
firm can be evaluated by deriving the elasticity of costs with respect to the economic 
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2.3 Data sources  
We use plant-level data for 1998-99 from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) conducted 
by the Central Statistical Office of the Government of India. The ‘factory’ or plant is the   9
unit of observation in the survey and data are based on returns provided by factories. Data 
on various firm-level production parameters such as output, sales, value added, labor cost, 
employees, capital, materials and energy are used in the analysis (see Table 1 for details). 
In summary, factory-level output is defined as the ex-factory value of products 
manufactured during the accounting year for sale. Capital is defined as the gross value of 
plant and machinery. It includes not only the book value of installed plant and machinery, 
but also the approximate value of rented-in plant and machinery. Labor is defined as the 
total number of employee man days worked and paid for by the factory during the 
accounting year.  
Table 1: Characteristics of firms in the study sectors 








nationwide all  industries  23201  4,605  60  277  127 
 food  processing  4168  671  47  253  147 
 textiles  3409  1,111  44  140  76 
 leather  468  79  41  211  135 
 
paper products & 
printing   1043 129  70  314  204 
 chemicals  2811  474  83  376  79 
 metals 2331  410  77  261  114 
 mechanical  machinery  1300  237  78  189  95 
  electrical/electronics  1267  251  101 344 65 
 other  industries  6404  1,243  54  385  195 
non urban    8343  1,494  50  301  126 
non metro urban    9446  1,972  58  235  125 
metropolitan 
areas   5412  1,139  74  320  133 
Note: Data for employment, wages/employee, output/employee and value added/employee are in thousands.  
Source: ASI 1998-99. 
 
The factory or plant level data from the Indian ASI allows us to compute input costs. With 
respect to input costs and input prices, capital cost is defined as the sum of rent paid for 
land, building, plant, and machinery, repair and maintenance cost for fixed capital, and 
interest on capital. Labor cost is calculated as the total wage paid for employees. Energy 
cost is the sum of electricity (both generated and purchased), petrol, diesel, oil, and coal 
consumed. The value of self-generated electricity is calculated from the average price that 
a firm pays to purchase electricity. Material cost is the total aggregate purchase value for 
domestic and foreign intermediate inputs. We define the price of capital as the ratio of total 
rent to the net fixed capital. The price of labor is calculated by dividing total wage by the 
number of employees. Energy and material prices are defined as weighted expenditure per 
unit output. Output value is weighted by factor cost shares.   10
2.4 Analysis results 
Summary results for the estimated cost functions of the economic geography variables, as 
defined in Equation (5), are reported in Table 3. To make allowances for the heterogeneity 
in firm size, and test if in fact there are differences in production costs and the impact of 
economic geography across firms of different sizes, we classify firms into three categories: 
small, medium, and large. Small firms are defined as those with less than 50 employees, 
medium sized are between 50-99 employees and large firms have 100 or more employees. 
The number of firms by size category are reported in Table 2.9  
Table 2: Number of establishments 
Industry    Small    Medium    Large    Total  
    (0-49)    (50-99)    (100+)     
 Food and beverages   1,808   708   1,484   4,000  
 Textiles   1,289   406   1,613   3,308  
 Leather   227    73    144    444  
 Printing and publishing    657   151    212   1,020  
 Chemicals   1,544   350    870   2,764  
 Metals   1,372   296    615   2,283  
 Mechanical machinery    799   160    316   1,275  
 Electrical/electronics    709    168   375   1,252  
 Total   8,405   2,312   5,629    16,346  
Source: See text. 
There are four sets of location/economic geography variables in the analysis: (a) access to 
markets (Access); (b) own industry concentration (Emp); (c) buyer supplier or input–
output linkages (IO link); (d) local economic diversity (Diversity). The results for each 
industry sector are provided in four parts. The first column has industry-wide cost 
elasticities. These are followed by estimates for small, medium, and large firms 
respectively. As we can see, sorting by firm size shows that there is significant variation in 
the extent to which firms of different sizes benefit from location based characteristics. In 
general, there is considerable heterogeneity in the impact of location characteristics on 
costs incurred at the firm level. This heterogeneity applies to the overall effects across 
industries, and includes differences across firms of different sizes and by sources of 
agglomeration economies.  
                                                 
9. There are some cells in Table 3 with no values. We do not report the estimated parameters in these cases as 
the number of observations (see Table 2) are too few to allow any meaningful interpretation of the results, 
especially when the model estimates around 50 parameters. As a rule of thumb, we do not report results for 
estimations with less than 200 observations (firms).   11
 
Table 3. Cost elasticities of economic geography variables 
     Access    Emp    IO Link    Diversity 
     overall  small  medium large    overall  small  medium large   overall small  medium large   overall small  medium large 
          (0-49) (50-99) (100+)    (0-49) (50-99) (100+)     (0-49) (50-99) (100+)    (0-49) (50-99) (100+) 
Food and beverages    -0.002  -0.001 -0.001  0.000    0.016  0.000 0.002 0.011    0.006  -0.001 -0.002  0.024  -0.075 0.000 -0.012 -0.067 
Textiles     0.004  0.023  0.008  -0.022   0.016 0.004 -0.033 -0.001    -0.002 -0.005 0.037 0.011    -0.102  -0.121 -0.210  -0.005 
Leather     0.072  -0.017       0.025  0.005      -0.014 0.010      -0.023 -0.172    
Printing and publishing   0.022  0.005    0.032    0.000  0.012  0.034    -0.009 -0.005  -0.092   -0.062  -0.248  0.0516 
Chemicals     -0.016  -0.024 -0.056  -0.044   0.021  0.021 0.059  0.049  0.000 0.003 -0.041  -0.012  -0.076 -0.457 0.042  0.250 
Metals     -0.017  -0.008 0.163  -0.012   0.003  0.004 0.137  -0.036  -0.012 0.000  -0.177  0.033  0.003  -0.163 0.603  0.039 
Mechanical machinery   -0.047  -0.016   0.091    0.000  0.006  -0.018    -0.001 0.000   -0.026   -0.007  -0.042  0.167 
Electrical/electronics     0.008 -0.009   0.035    0.019 0.038   0.035  -0.004 0.004   0.378  -0.162 -0.835   -2.355 
Note: Coefficients in bold are significant at 1%, coefficients underlined are significant at 5%. 




Let us begin by looking at the impact of access to markets. Market access measures 
effective demand for a firm’s products and inputs and the ease through which they can 
reach buyers and suppliers. Therefore, good market access is likely to reduce the cost of 
intermediate inputs as well as increase demand for the firm’s products. The entrepreneur 
will have incentives to increase scale of production and invest in cost reducing 
technologies (Lall et al. 2004). At the industry-wide level, the results show that market 
access does not have a significant net cost reducing impact in most industry sectors. The 
estimated cost elasticities are negative and statistically significant for two industry 
sectors—metals and mechanical machinery—the elasticity values are insignificant for 
other sectors. For example, in mechanical machinery, the coefficient of –0.047 means that 
a 10 percent improvement in market access will be associated with an approximately 0.5 
percent reduction in overall costs at the firm level. There is a counter intuitive result for the 
leather industry, where the cost elasticity is positive and significant. For small firms, the 
estimated elasticities are generally negative, indicating benefits from improved market 
access. However, the estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level for only 
two industry sectors—chemicals and metals. We also find a positive and significant 
estimate for the textiles industry, suggesting that there are costs associated with higher 
market access. Most of the estimates for medium and large industries are not statistically 
significant.  
 
Next we look at results for own industry concentration, which is measured as the sum of 
employment in the particular industry in the region. The industry-wide estimates suggest 
that there are no net benefits of being located in own industry concentrations. All the 
estimated elasticities are positive, which suggests that costs increase if firms locate in 
regions with high concentrations of the same industry. These coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level for four sectors and significant at 5 percent for one 
industry sector. We find that even when disaggregated by firm size, own industry 
concentration systematically provides no net benefits; on the contrary, in some instances, 
own industry concentration increases costs at the firm level.  
 
The elasticities for input–output linkages (IO link) show that for most industry sectors, 
proximity to buyers and suppliers potentially reduces costs at the firm level. While the 
estimated elasticities are negative for six sectors, it is only statistically significant at the 5 
percent level for the metals industry. The coefficient of –0.01 means that a 10 percent 
increase in the strength of buyer–supplier linkages is associated with firm-level cost 
reductions of 0.1 percent. That is, doubling the strength of buyer–supplier linkages is 
associated with a 1 percent reduction in firm level production costs. When we look at the 
elasticities for small firms, we find that the estimates are insignificant for most cases. For 
medium size firms, the elasticity is negative and significant for the metals sector. The 
coefficient of –0.17 means that a doubling of IO linkages is associated with a 17 percent 
reduction in firm-level costs. This effect is considerably stronger than the other estimates, 
where the cost elasticities rarely exceed 5 percent. For large firms, we find that costs 
increase for food and beverages and for electrical/electronics, when firms are located in   13
regions with relatively higher buyer–supplier linkages. In fact, the coefficient of 0.38 for 
electrical/electronics means that doubling of IO links increases costs by 38 percent. 
 
The estimates for local economic diversity indicate that there are considerable cost 
reducing benefits from being located in a diverse region. The industry-wide estimates are 
negative for all sectors, and significant at the 1 percent level for the Food and Beverages 
and Textiles sectors. The coefficient of -0.10 for Textiles means that doubling of the 
region’s economic diversity will reduce firm-level costs by 10 percent. The results are even 
stronger for small firms. The estimated elasticities are negative for all industry sectors, and 
statistically significant for five sectors. The magnitude of these effects is really striking. 
For example, the estimated cost elasticity for electrical/electronics is 83 percent and for 
chemicals it is 46 percent. These estimates clearly indicate that there are very significant 
benefits of being located in a diverse economic region. For medium and larger firms 
however, the results do not show similar benefits of location in diverse economic regions. 
The cost reducing effects of being located in a diverse region are greater for small firms as 
they can rely on location-based externalities to a larger extent than medium and big firms. 
The benefits come from better opportunities for subcontracting, access to a general pool of 
skilled labor, and access to business services, such as banking, advertising, and legal 
services. In addition to these pecuniary externalities, there are potential technological 
externalities from knowledge transfer across industries. Larger firms being more vertically 
integrated and with higher fixed costs are not likely to benefit from these externalities.10  
 
In general, we find that the regional economic geography has a reasonable degree of 
impact on the cost structure of firms. The sources and the magnitudes of these impacts vary 
considerably across industry sectors. The only major source of benefits that are likely to 
influence location choice at the margin is the location’s economic diversity. This is further 
likely to be the case for small firms. The magnitude of the other effects are so small 
(elasticity values less than 5 percent), that they are unlikely to influence firm location 
choices.  
3  Location patterns of private and state capital 
This section contains an empirical test of the hypothesis that the location logic of state 
capital is different from that of private capital. Much of this material is summarized from 
Chakravorty (2003). Private capital seeks profit maximizing or efficient locations. As 
shown above, these are the already leading, diverse industrial regions that have the 
necessary infrastructure and economies of agglomeration (which, we show, are not 
necessarily cost-reducing). The location decisions of state capital, on the other hand, are 
not as oriented towards the leading industrial regions because, besides efficiency, these 
decisions are based on equity and security considerations.  
                                                 
10. While the estimated elasticity for large electrical/electronics firms is 235 percent, it is likely that this 
result is a statistical artifact, and driven by some outliers.    14
 
We will not revisit the literature on industrial location theory that is summarized well in 
Fujita et al. (1999). The basic assumption in this literature is that all capital is private 
capital, and all location decisions are made by profit maximizing private firms. The fact 
that the state is a significant owner of firms and industries is not considered. There are 
three major reasons why this is an omission of some consequence. First, state decisions on 
industry location are not necessarily or usually profit maximizing.11 Second, in all 
developing nations industrialization has been state-led, so that the state, to some degree, 
still owns the ‘commanding heights’ of the industrial sector. Third, state industrial location 
decisions have considerable influence on the location decisions of private firms (mainly 
through the provision of shared infrastructure and localization economies). 
 
Let us, like others before us, presume that market considerations are the only ones that 
need to be factored into the industrial location decision. There are two broad approaches to 
identifying the factors that influence firm location: One is survey-based; it asks decision-
makers what location factors are important to them. The second is a modeling approach 
used to identify the revealed preferences based on site/region characteristics. A large 
number of factors, with some overlap, have been identified using these two approaches. In 
general, the most important firm location criteria are: market access, infrastructure 
availability, agglomeration economies, state regulations (such as environmental and 
pollution standards, incentives in lagging regions or for emerging technologies), and the 
general level of political support (see Hanushek and Song 1978; Webber 1984; McCann 
1998). The survey-based approaches reveal that there is a substantial random element in 
the choice of location: personal reasons, chance, and opportunity, are given as explanations 
almost half the time (see Mueller and Morgan 1962; Calzonetti and Walker 1991). 
 
This analysis follows the revealed preference modeling approach. We consider the 
following categories of factors: 
(1)  Capital, which refers to the quantity and productivity of the existing capital 
investments, and the availability of industrial capital from lenders. 
(2)  Labor, which refers the size of the industrial and total labor pool in the region, and the 
productivity of industrial labor. The size of the industrial labor pool is a measure of 
urbanization economies. 
(3)  Infrastructure  includes elements of physical and social infrastructure. Physical 
infrastructure elements such as roads and transportation hubs (ports, airports) are 
widely considered to be key determinants of plant location. Indicators of social 
                                                 
11 Other approaches to location analysis recognize the ‘different locational considerations’ of state capital, 
especially the following ones. First, the need to include and provide for the ‘poor and the geographically 
peripheral’. Second, the absence of competition in what are often (loss-making) monopolies. Third, the need to 
seek popular support, and the use of state investment as a method of doing so; Fourth, the use of industrial 
location as the principal tool in regional development policy. Fifth, one must consider the location of security-
oriented or defense-related industry, which is obviously not dictated by market factors. See Harrington and Wharf 
(1995), Markusen et al. (1991), Chapman and Walker (1991).   15
infrastructure such as health and education standards provide an understanding of 
quality of life conditions, and may be considered to be worker amenities, which may 
be critical for some industries.  
(4)  Regulation  broadly refers to the system of incentives (such as tax breaks) and 
disincentives (such as environmental standards) which have to be factored into the 
location decision. This kind of highly localized or disaggregated information is 
difficult to get at the national level. This is especially true of India, where the key to 
decision-making may not be the localized incentive system but a sense of political 
support for private sector-led industrialization in the region. Regimes that are 
ideologically opposed to liberalization are unlikely to provide the conditions that 
welcome new private investments, or may be perceived to be unfriendly to capital. 
(5)  Geography includes spatial characteristics such as coastal or metropolitan location. 
Coastal locations provide access to the external world and physical amenities desired 
by high-level managers. Metropolitan locations provide large local markets, 
urbanization economies, and, often, localization economies.  
 
3.1 Data and summary conditions 
Earlier we have shown why it is necessary to conduct location analysis using small spatial 
units. We have also discussed the ASI database. Here the ASI for 1993-94 provides data 
for the pre-reform or initial conditions.12 The second or post-reform database was created 
from the published records of the private sector firms, the Center for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE). It is widely acknowledged that the best economic data in India are 
being generated by the CMIE (especially since there is no state agency tracking post-
reform projects). The database used here is a collation of new project information 
published quarterly by the CMIE for the period 1992-98. The 1991 data were ignored, as 
they were unlikely to be an accurate list of ‘new’ investments; after all, the reforms had 
only been announced in July 1991. This database, with about 4,650 records or projects 
(covering the entire period), containing only those projects that have been completed or are 
under implementation, and those that are not being funded solely by local government, 
forms the basis of all the post-reform calculations. 
 
The new or post-reform investments, as identified from the CMIE data, total just over 
seven trillion Indian rupees (not including the direct investments made by state/local 
governments, which have been ignored throughout this analysis).13 Exactly 50 percent of  
                                                 
12. Since the 1993-94 data cover every unit that was in operation in 1993, whenever built, and since the 
period 1991-93 (the first two reform years) is too short for any substantial industrial unit to be approved and 
go into production, this is the most realistic measure of Indian industry for the pre-reform period. 
13. These figures also do not include investments in Jammu and Kashmir nor any of the far northeastern 
states (Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalay, Mizoram, Nagaland, or Tripura). The total of these 
investments comprise less than 0.2 percent of nationwide investment, is almost entirely by the central and 
state governments, and is probably of dubious reliability. These data can be ignored without much loss of 
information or rigor.    16
Table 4: Distribution of industrial investment by type of ownership 
   Fixed  Capital    
  1973-74 1985-86 1989-90 1994-95 1992-98 
Public  60.1 61.6 55.0 43.3 30.7 
Joint  5.6 10.2  7.5 9.5 12.0 
Private  34.3 28.2 37.5 47.2 57.3 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (different years), and CMIE for 1998 (authors’ calculations). 
 
this investment is by the domestic private sector, 7.3 percent is FDI, 30.7 percent is by the 
central government, and 12 percent is in the joint sector (or private–public partnerships). 
For the purposes of the analysis here, the domestic private sector and FDI are added 
together to comprise the private sector. The joint sector data, which belongs in neither of 
our exclusive categories, have also been omitted from the analysis.  
Table 5: Summary investment statistics by location  
  Private Sector  Central Government 
Number of districts with investment  294  164 
Average investment in receiving districts  13.55  11.40 
All India per-district investment  9.84  4.61 
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Source: Data sources are discussed in the text.  
Note. The investment averages are in billion rupees (in June 2003, US$1=INR48). 
 
Table 4 shows the extent to which the relative shares of the public and private sectors have 
evolved since the early 1970s. The decline of the public sector since the beginning of the 
Rajiv Gandhi reforms in 1985-86 is evident. The new investment data (1992-98) suggests 
that this decline has accelerated. This is a fundamental condition of liberalization and 
structural reform, and underlines our assertion that the state’s role in industry ownership   17
and location is now much diminished. Table 5 provides some indications on the spatial 
distribution of the post-reform investments. The data show that private sector investments 
have a wider spatial coverage and a much stronger coastal bias (almost half the total 
private investments are in the coastal districts). The metropolitan data are unclear; certainly 
the intensity of investments in these districts is far higher than the non-metropolitan 
averages for both private and state sectors, but there appears to be some dispersal away 
from metropolitan districts. 
3.2 The model and methodological notes 
Following the earlier discussions, a general model of new investment location 
determination can be written formally as: 
 
Inew = f{K, L, I, R, S}   (7) 
 
Where K, L, I, R, and S represent sets of explanatory Capital, Labor, Infrastructure, 
Regulation, and Spatial/Geographical variables respectively. Inew is the log transformation 
of the raw investment amount where the investment amount depends on the sector being 
modeled. That is, Inew is InewP when only private sector investments are considered, and is 
InewG when only central government investments are considered. The Capital set K has 
three variables:14 
1. ASI-LOG is the log of total pre-reform investment (fixed capital).  
2.  INDUSTRIAL CREDIT is per capita lending to local industry by financial institutions.  
3. CAPITAL_PROD is a measure of the productivity of capital at the district level, and is 
calculated as the value added per unit of fixed capital for existing industry (calculated 
from the ASI data).  
 
There are three Labor variables: 
1. LOGPOP is the log of district population.  
2.  LABOR_MANUF is the percentage of workers employed in non-household 
manufacturing industry. 
3. LABOR_PROD is a measure of the productivity of labor and is calculated as the value 
added per unit of factory labor (calculated from the ASI data). 
 
                                                 
14. The data definitions and sources, unless mentioned otherwise, are as follows. Literacy: from the 1991 
population census, reported in ‘Profiles of Districts’, defined as the percentage of the population that is 
literate. Infant Mortality: from Rajan and Mohanchandran (1998), defined as the number of deaths per 
1,000 live births at age 5, estimated from the 1991 population census. Manufacturing Labor: from the 1991 
population census, reported in ‘Profiles of Districts’, defined as the percentage of workers employed in non-
household manufacturing industries. Industrial Credit: reported in ‘Profiles of Districts’, defined as the per 
capita bank credit to industries derived from the information on scheduled commercial bank branches, deposits 
and credits on the last Friday of March 1993. ‘Profiles of Districts’ is a CMIE publication in 1993 from Bombay.   18
There are three Infrastructure variables: 
1. INFRA is a measure of physical infrastructure, and is calculated as a function of 
proximity to national highways, airports and ports. The values of INFRA range from 0 
to 3, where 3 represents a situation where the given district has at least one national 
highway passing through it (weight 1), has at least one airport within 100 kilometers 
(weight 1), and has at least one port within 100 kilometers (weight 1). INFRA is 
expected to be positively related to Inew, especially InewP. 
2. LITERACY, is the percentage of the adult population that is literate. 
3. INFNT_MORT is the mortality rate at age five years per 1000 live births. 
 
The only Regulation variable is: 
1. SOCIALIST, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for every district in 
West Bengal and Kerala, the two consistently communist-ruled states in the country. 
Districts in Tripura (another socialist state) were not used in the analysis, and we chose 
not to assign districts in Bihar as socialist. Bihar has what may be called a populist 
caste-based government, and giving it the distinction of socialism, for better or worse, 
may be inappropriate. The other problem with including Bihar in  this category is that 
every other state that has had left-of-center governments in the early 1990s (such as 
Karnataka and Orissa) would also have to be similarly characterized. As far as this 
variable is meant to represent political will, which may be resistance to liberalization, or 
its counterpart, enthusiasm for reforms, Bihar should be so categorized. But, 
understanding the lack of investment in Bihar is an important goal, and we preferred not 
to cloud the issue by introducing the socialist element.  
 
The Spatial set S has three elements: 
1. COASTAL, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all coastal districts (57 
districts were classified coastal, i.e., situated on either the Bay of Bengal or the Gulf of 
Arabia).  
2. METROPOLITAN, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all metropolitan 
districts i.e., the core city district and the surrounding suburban districts (26 districts 
were classified metropolitan).  
3. SPATIAL LAG: SPATIAL LAG is a term that corrects for spatial autocorrelation and 
also has geographical meaning.15 It is a measure of spatial clustering, and the parameter 
estimates for this term will indicate the degree to which  new investments cluster 
together; i.e., the extent to which InewP is likely to locate in the proximity of other InewP.  
                                                 
15. The existence of spatial autocorrelation or spatial dependence poses serious problems in regression 
modeling, much like serial autocorrelation does (see Anselin 1995). One of the ways of dealing with this 
problem is to add a ‘spatial lag’ term on the right-hand side, where the lag value for a given parcel is some 
summary of the dependent variable in proximate parcels. The argument for using the spatial lag correction 
for a given district is that its investment is not independently caused by the regressors, but is dependent on 
the regional investment situation. Therefore, the spatial lag term corrects for spatial autocorrelation in spatial 
regression models, and at the same time is a measure of clustering.   19
Table 6. Determinants of probability of receiving investment  











































































Chi-square 172.32   117.40   
Correctly predicted non-zero districts  91.50%   59.15%  
Notes: Total number of districts = 405. Number of districts with non-zero private sector investment = 292. 
Number of districts with non-zero central government investment = 164. Figures in parenthesis are Wald 
statistics. 
***Significant at 1%. 
**Significant at 5%. 
*Significant at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
A major problem in undertaking Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions with this data 
is that the assumption of normality of the dependent variable is seriously violated. There 
are large numbers of districts with no investment (the private sector has 292 districts with 
investment, 113 without investment; the central government sector has 164 districts with 
investment, 241 without investment). These are not missing data, but are real measured 
absence of industrial investment. Hence, we cannot use OLS models on the full dataset. 
But using only the non-zero data would not allow analysis of the absence of investment.   20
Therefore we use two sets of models: a linear model set for the non-zero cases; and a 
logistic model set where the dependent variable is binary—i.e., it takes a value of 1 when 
there is some non-zero investment (call this ‘success’), and 0 when there is no investment 
(call this situation ‘failure’).  
3.3 Model findings 
The private sector logistic model (see Table 6) has far greater explanatory power than the 
model for the central government. The Chi-square value is higher, as is the percentage of 
correctly predicted non-zero new investment districts. The two most important 
determinants of success or failure for private investment, that is, whether or not a district 
receives any new private sector investment, are the quantity of investment in the pre-
reform era (ASI-LOG), and the quantity of new private investment in the neighboring 
districts in the post-reform era (Spatial Lag). On the other hand, the Spatial Lag term is not 
significant for central government investment, implying that there are no clustering effects 
in this case. Similarly the ASI-LOG variable has the expected but less significant effect in 
the central government model. 
 
The set of Labor variables (population size, size of manufacturing labor force, and labor 
productivity) are all significant for the private sector model, indicating that labor 
considerations play a significant role in the private sector location decision. In the central 
government model, labor is a less important consideration—the district population size is 
significant, as is, to a lesser extent, the size of the manufacturing labor force, but labor 
productivity is of no consequence. The role of infrastructure is as expected. The literacy 
and infant mortality levels have little bearing on whether a district receives private sector 
or central government investment. The availability of physical infrastructure, on the other 
hand, plays a weak positive role in attracting private sector investment, but has no bearing 
on locating central government investment. Finally, private investment tends to avoid 
socialist states, but central government investments appear to be indifferent to local 
political orientation. 
 
The OLS regression model (see Table 7) for the private sector is strong and robust; for the 
central government it is weak, with little explanatory power. The two most revealing trends 
of the logistic models are further confirmed here: First, the two most significant predictors 
of the quantity of new private investment are ASI-LOG and Spatial Lag, whereas in the 
central government model, ASI-LOG is not significant; however, the Spatial Lag variable 
is significant (unlike in the logistic model), suggesting that though the odds of getting new 
central government investment are no better in clusters, when such investments do take 
place, the quantity of investment is spatially correlated. In other words, the quantity of 
existing investment in a given district i or the quantity of new private investment in the 
neighbors of district i, are the most important predictors of the quantity of new private 
sector investment in that district. Second, Labor characteristics are significant in predicting 
the quantity of new private sector investments, but not for central government investments.   21
In fact, population size and manufacturing labor force size have the counter-intuitive sign 
(though not statistically significant) in the central government model.  





 Central  government 
















































































11.13 (.00)   2.30 (.00)  
R-square (adjusted)  0.310   0.094  
Note: This is an OLS regression model. The dependent variable is LOG of (private sector or central 
government) investment. 
***Significant at 1% (two-tailed). 
**Significant at 5% (two-tailed). 
*Significant at 10% 
(two-tailed). 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The infrastructure variables generally have the least explanatory power in both OLS 
models. In the central government model, none of the infrastructure variables are   22
significant. Unexpectedly, infant mortality is seen to be weakly but positively related to 
new private sector investment. It is possible that this is an artifact of the coexistence of 
high infant mortality levels and richness of natural resource availability. Finally, the 
coastal variable is strongly significant in the private sector model. This is expected from 
the data reported in Table 5. 
3.4 Discussion  
This analysis was based on the argument that private sector investment location decisions 
are based on profit-maximizing or efficiency-related factors, whereas the central 
government investment location decisions would be less influenced by them. We also 
argued that in seeking efficient locations, private sector investments would tend to favor 
existing industrial clusters and metropolitan centers with access to the coast, and avoid 
regions with inhospitable local governments. The results provide definite support for both 
propositions. Location decisions of the private sector are indeed guided by efficiency-
related factors to a far greater extent than such decisions by the central government. In 
addition, private sector investments are seen to favor existing industrial clusters (providing 
support for the idea that the already leading industrial regions would benefit most), and 
coastal districts, and are seen to be averse to communist or socialist states. There is less 
support for the argument that such investments also favor metropolitan regions. On the 
other hand, central government investments appear not to be guided by any clear 
geographical consideration. These findings are consistent in both modeling frameworks: 
success/failure, and the quantity of new investment—in other words, in determining 
whether or not a district gets new investment, and in determining the quantity of new 
investment.  
 
It is clear that for the private sector the most significant factors are the size of investment 
from the pre-reform period in the same district, and the size of new post-reform investment 
in the neighboring districts. The first factor suggests continuity, or evidence of a historical 
process of investment location. The second factor suggests that new investments are 
clustered. In the central government models there is very weak evidence of some 
continuity (none as far as the quantity of new investment is concerned); and somewhat 
stronger evidence of clustering (though not nearly as strong as for the private sector).16  
4. Conclusion 
Our main finding from the first part of the analysis is that industrial diversity (that is, the 
local presence of a mix of industries) provides significant cost savings for individual firms. 
Empirical evidence from Indian firms shows that this cost saving is the most significant 
                                                 
16. Note that these models are unable to identify all the factors that influence industrial location decisions. 
There is a random element in the distribution (remember that personal preference or chance is the most 
common factor in the location decision). Also there are non-random local factors—such as local- or state-
level policy changes (tax incentives, the location of export processing and/or free trade zones, etc.), and some 
intangibles like culture, entrepreneurship, and initiative—that have not been modeled here.   23
factor for firms of all sizes and in all sectors of manufacturing industry. Other spatial 
factors that, in theory, have some productivity enhancing effects (such as market access, 
own industry clustering) are found to have little or no influence on profitability. At the 
national level, this raises questions on the validity of developing ‘specialized clusters’ in 
remote areas, as instruments to promote regional development in lagging or backward 
regions. Such approaches have been implemented with limited success historically, but 
have seen a resurgence with the ‘Porter style’ competitive advantage analysis. On the other 
hand, policies that encourage the creation and growth of mixed industrial districts are 
likely to be more successful than single industry concentrations. 
 
The second part of the analysis confirms our expectations that private industry seeks profit-
maximizing locations whereas state industry is far less oriented toward such locations. The 
emerging spatial pattern of industrialization is led by investments by the private sector 
which is demonstrably averse to lagging and inland regions, just as the central government 
is becoming a weaker player. If the state will not or cannot be any more involved (for the 
foreseeable future the state can only be less involved in industrial ownership), and the 
private sector cannot be induced to lagging regions till some local political–economic 
problems are resolved, and these local problems may not be resolved without investment 
and growth, how can industrial development reach the lagging regions, and, without 
spatially balanced industrial growth, how can spatial income inequalities be mitigated?   
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